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Introduction 
. It would be hypocritical for a paper on the politics of morality to adopt an 
amoral attitude and assume that public ·standards of conduct can be 
discussed from a semiotic viewpoint unaffected by personal taste, inclina­
tion, and prejudice. It would also be pretentious for a rhetorical investiga­
tion of power to try and efface the figurality of its own language, insisting 
that it only serves the enlightened interests of its readers. Let us begin, 
then, by simply admitting that this rhetorical investigation of public 
standards of conduct (and the consequences of their violation) does not 
consider its political biases a sin nor its approach to the moral sign as 
unadulterated by violent means. The discussion that follows accepts . · 
without guilt that it consists in a series of tactical visits to texts which are 
commonly perceived as. 'literature', 'criticism', 'sociology', and 'philos­
ophy' in order to examine how the violent power of moral rhetoric is 
exercised. The deliberate transgressi<!n of genre liIJJ,itations attempts not 
only to attend to the intertextual nature of all tSlgn function but also to 
indicate the possibility of a semiotic that is more rhetorical than 
hermeneutic in that it views understanding as production and consump­
tion rather than reception and use. If the sin of the sign is investigated in 
these pages through the signs of sin, this is clearly done in the hope that at 
the end its sinister power to signalize guilt-will lose moral significance. In 
effect, this_cautionary note of introduction invites you to stay tuned rather 
than sign off. 
The rhetoric of moral violence 
1. Harold Bfoom, in his exposition of Kabbalistic hermeneutics as a 
source of inspiration for his own antithetical criticism, draws oil Peirce's 
three classes of ideas, those Qf Firstness, of Secondness, and of Thirdness, 
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and concludes that 'poems are truly triads, ideas of Thirdness' (Bloom 
1975a: 56). He clarifies his point by commenting on a passage by Peirce: 
'A sign mediates between the in�erpretant sign and its object. ... A Third is 
something which brings a First into relation to a Second .. . .' Bloom 
translates this insight into a fundamental principle of literary history: 'A 
poem is an idea of Thirdness, or a triadic relation, because the sign is the 
new poem, its object is the precursor text (however composite or 
imaginary), and the interpreting thought is the reading of the poem, but 
this reading is itself a sign' (1975a: 57). 
But far more than the semiotics of intertextuality and poetic tradition, 
what interests Bloom is the positions available to the individual (and 
especially Eliot's 'individual talent') in this triadic relation, and his 
neurotic experience of it. This crucial difference is illuminated by another 
misprision of Peirce: while he asserts that 'all the cognitive faculties we 
know of are relative' and that 'the cognition of a relation is determined by 
previous cognitions', Bloom turns his attention to the semiosis of anxiety, 
and the above epistemological position is translated into a psychological 
comment: 'All interpretation depends upon the antithetical relation 
between meanings, and not on the supposed relation between a text and 
its meaning' (1975: 76). This allows for a sweeping Freudian generaliza­
tion: what was previously regarded only as a post-Enlightenment symp­
tom, Poetic Influence as 'a disease of self-consciousness' (1973: 29), is now 
seen as a transhistorical phenomenon of the human psyche: 'The aftliction 
of belatedness ... is a recurrent malaise of Western consciousness' 
(1975: 77). Suffering, it is implied, is the mode of the experience of poetry 
and its triadic relation: the Western man suffers from late reading, from a 
reading of his tradition that comes too late to give salvation from the exile 
into language. 
It is important to emphasize the theological roots and orientation of 
Bloom's theory of influence which privileges guilt as the driving force 
behind all artistic creativity. In this context, belatedness and the ensuing 
despair of impotence are not simply a disease but a curse that haunts the 
pitiful late-comer with an ineradicable guilt. After the 'Fall of Poetic 
Influence' (1973: 71), for the strong poet, the noble sinner of our 
civilization, 
The curse of an increased belatedness, a dangerously self-conscious belatedness, is 
that creative envy becomes the ecstacy, the Sublime, of the sign-system of poetic 
language. (1976: 5) 
Now that salvation is beyond reach, heroic damnation remains the only 
possible atonement: 'the belated creator achieves the uniqueness of his 
own consciousness through a kind of fall' (1976: 13). 
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Starting with the semiosis of anxiety, Bloom moves through a psycho­
pathology of artistic belatedness to his own 'history of interpretation', 
which is 'the history of revisionism and canon-formation in purely secular 
literary tradition' (1975a: 122-23). But revisionism is examined from the 
viewpoint of those condemned to revise, of those who unavoidably violate 
because they suffer the violence of tradition. Bloom's project is not a 
history of signs, an archaeology of Thirdness, but a 'genealogy of 
imagination', 'a study of the only guilt that matters to a poet, the guilt of 
indebtedness' (1973: 117) - and only of the poets who matter. In this 
chapter where he discusses purgation through sublimation, he considers 
this guilt, the cause of the anxiety of influence, as the curse befell on the 
individual talent for his belated appearance in the scene of writing after 
the departure of the gods. What is more, the guilt is affirmed and the sin 
of poetry is endorsed with such romantic conviction that the biblical 
rhetoric naturalizes the terror of tradition beyond even the reader's 
recognition. 
Opposite to this conception of guilt-as-theodicy which tends to engulf 
the reader in a triadic relation of anguish and angst toward Bloom's text, 
stands the attempt to expose the religious presuppositions of the concept 
of guilt, an enterprise mounted by Nietzsche, whom the theoretician of 
Influence himself accepts as the 'true psychologist of this guilt' 
(1973: 117). Indeed, in his Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche discusses 'the 
fear of the ancestor and his power, the consciousness of indebtedness to 
him' (1967: 89), but his account is a socio-historical one. The anxiety of 
belatedness first developed in the 'original tribal community' as a result of 
th� 'relationship of the present generation and its ancestors' (1967: 88). 
For every new generation, the burden of the past, the size of the debt, and 
the fear of responsibility is such that 'in the end the ancestor must 
necessarily be transfigured into a god' (1967: 89). Much later, this 
overriding 'consciousness of being in debt' was transformed, with the 
advent of the Christian God, into the 'guilty feeling of indebtedness to the 
divinity' (1967: 90). 
This description is strongly reminiscent of Bloom's notion of the 
precursor poet whose imposing shadow looms large over the ephebe's 
desperate effort to find and express himself. The relationship between 
successive generations described by Nietzsche in specific socio-economic 
terms is conceived by Bloom as a mythical gigantomachy among strong 
poets. But the overlooked fact that he spares no attention or respect for 
the weak artist is not the most frightful aspect of his literary theogony; it 
is rather the curse o_f guilt it inflicts upon all poets that gives to his 
readings their authoritarian power and to his ideas their presumptuous 
Firstness. Bloom's criticism practices what Nietzsche means when he talks 
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about the 'moralization of the concepts' guilt and duty, their being 
pushed back into the bad conscience' (1976: 91). 
Nietzsche attributes the way man experiences guilt, the way 'he 
stretches himself upon the contradiction "God" and "Devil" ', to the 'will 
to self-tormenting' (1976: 92), 'the will of man to find himself guilty and 
reprehensible to a degree that can never be atoned for; his will to think 
himself punished without any possibility of the punishment becoming 
equal to the guilt; .. . his will to erect an ideal . .  .' (1967: 93). This is not 
only a deconstruction of Bloomian theology but also a magisterial 
destruction of the romantic Sublime, which ends with a demanding 
question that is still very much with us: 'But have you ever asked 
yourselves how much the erection of every ideal has cost?' (1967: 95). 
Bloom's theory of the guilty indebtedness can be seen from a Ni­
etzschean perspective as a symptom of what he calls 'the great nausea, the 
will to nothingness, nihilism' (1967: 96): 'We modern men are the heirs of 
the conscience-vivisection and self-torture of millenia' (1967: 95). But if 
influence is 'a disease of self-consciousness' (Bloom); if 'bad conscience is 
an illness' 1967: 88); if guilt is an expression of the 'will to self­
maltreatment' (1967: 88), how did 'the consciousness of guilt, "the bad 
conscience", come into the world?' (1967: 62). This is where the genealogy 
of guilt and the semiotics of the rhetoric of violence begin. 
2. Nietzsche's relevant discussion in the Second Essay of the Genealogy is 
part of his critique of moral values. He argues that 'the major moral 
concept Schuld [guilt] has its origin in the very material concept Schulden 
[debts]' (1967: 62) and traces it back to the 'contractual relationship 
between creditor and debtor' (1967: 63). This relationship was, of course, 
defined, guaranteed, and guarded by the institution of law that provided 
imperative guidelines about what is just and consequently what is 
forbidden. The experience of guilt, therefore, is directly connected with 
the transgression of the law, the deviant interpretation- of the legal sign, 
which breaks the established rules of traffic and trade. 'It was in this 
sphere then, the sphere of legal obligations', Nietzsche concludes, 'that 
the moral conceptual world of "guilt", "conscience" "duty", "sacredness 
of duty" had its origin' (1967: 65). 
The rhetoric of moral violence was first exercised through the discourse 
of law, its language of prohibition and exclusion - an absolute code of 
obligatory behavior whose use did not allow for any interpretive freedom. 
This discourse was also the first nomothetical expression of a firm and 
coherent 'moral view of the world: the feelings of a social order or rank 
are projected into the universe: irremovability, law, classification and co­
ordination' (1967a: 359). Thro:ugh adherence and obedience to it, such an 
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absolute system of signs eventually becomes internalized: one follows its 
rules automatically and tends to misunderstand its imposition as the 
natural order of things one has to comply with. 'A m9rality, a mode of 
livi11g tried and proved by long experience and testing, at length enters 
consciousness as a law, as dominating' (1967a: 277). A critical application 
or a sceptical attitude are no longer possible; the violence of law is 
assimilated by the guilty conscience as duty and signs are identified with 
things. 
The confrontation of the instinct for freedom with the institution of law 
caused the illness of bad conscience and the infection of guilt. Morality as 
a consequence of bad conscience is the internalization of law, the 
suppression of the will to freedom, the unconditional acceptance of the 
legal code, and the naturalization of a sign system as a set of rules of 
conduct. Thus innocence coincided with complete obedience and stirred 
the perenially unfulfilled yearning for absolution and admittance into the 
kingdom of law. This process of normalizing acculturation has been 
always greatly promoted by the eager contributions of philosophy and 
religion, which help justify the violence of morality. In the realm of 
philosophy first, Nietzsche distinguishes between 'two kinds of philoso­
pher': those who ascertain and those who legislate (logical or moral) 
evaluations. 'The former try to master the world of the present or the past 
by concentrating and abridging the multiplicity of events through signs . 
. . . The latter, however, are commanders' (1967a: 509-10). 
The importance of Nietzsche's thought for semiotics has been grossly 
overlooked for ideological reasons that deserve another paper. Here, at 
least, we have a very interesting example of his surprisingly pertinent 
remarks on the politics of semiosis: what distinguishes the first kind of 
philosopher is the use of signs in order to structure experience in a way 
that is necessarily exclusive but not absolute; while the other kind 
legislates the correct use of signs by decree. Undoubtedly, those who 
belong to the former category understand that 'purposes and utilities are 
only signs that a will to power has become master of something less 
powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function; and the entire 
history of a "thing", an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous 
sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations' (1967: 77). This is 
exactly what Peirce meant with his 'Third': the interpretation of a sign is 
itself another sign added to the ever increasing chain of readings and 
appropriations; it is this continuous development of human 
understanding and communication that authority tries to stop and block 
violently. 
Nietzsche's distinction between philosophies of validity and philoso­
phies of closure (and their respective rhetoric) is particularly useful. 
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Philosophers who ascertain evaluations must be aware that validating a 
sign-system into a law is 'giving a false reality to a fiction' (1967a: 282); 
while those who legislate evaluations based on their conception of wrong 
command obedience by invoking the idea that 'the object of evil and 
suffering is salvation' (1967a: 164). Their point of divergence and disa­
greement is of a semiotic nature but it soon acquires moral significance: 
are there any principles for the correct use of signs? if not, following the 
rules is a matter of interpretation; if yes, breaking the rules is a question of 
transgression. In the first case, morality is seen as a system of conventions, 
in the second as a set of obligatory norms: ignoring the conventions 
expresses disagreement. violating the norms entails guilt. 
The price of transgression is 'punishment as the isolation of a disturb­
ance of equilibrium' (1967: 80). Punishment is the law's retribution for 
one's abortive attempt to negotiate his interpretive freedom. When the 
validity of the legal system comes under question and its arbitrariness as a 
semiotic construct is foregrounded, the restoration of equilibrium is 
effected by the moralization of the disturbance that charges the transgres­
sor with guilt and necessitates his punishment. Guilt, Nietzsche argues 
(contra Bloom), is the supreme mode of the rhetoric of moral violence. 
Guilt originated with the 'internalization of man' (1967: 84): when the 
human instincts were interiorized and the soul was born, when the 
individual appeared in the scene of history as pure consciousness, when 
the law turned from a convention into an institution, the bad conscience 
of the indebtor experienced the guilt of transgression. But it was only the 
intervention of religion that moralized the whole question by turning 
transgression into evil and guilt into sin. 
Nietzsche's account of the justification of the violence of morality by 
religion evolves around the cardinal notion of sin and is based on a 
distinction between Hellenism and Judaism. The Greek gods were the real 
carriers and originators of evil in a way that rendered it all too human as 
an integral part of man's life. 'For the longest time these Greeks used their 
gods precisely so as to ward off the "bad conscience", so as to be able to 
rejoice in their freedom of soul' (1967: 93). Seen as a loose transcendental 
semiotic system, they were the effective displacement of metaphysics in 
the realm of conventional wisdom and social convention as represented in 
the public rituals of drama and democracy: 'in those days they took upon 
themselves, not the punishment but, what is nobler, the guilt' (1967: 94). 
That, Nietzsche might have added, was the epistemological break that 
allowed for the birth of tragedy. 
A completely different Weltanschauung was expressed by 'Judaism, 
whose principal deed was to associate guilt with misfortune and to reduce 
all guilt to guilt against God' (1967a: 110-11). This exploitation of guilt 
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feelings by religion led to the introduction of sin as the fundamental mode 
of human existence. The social experience of indebtedness and the 
physiological experience of depression, combined in the repression of the 
will to freedom by law, were translated from the secular (guilt) to the 
sacred level (sin) where law was viewed as God's will. Thus the system of 
signs already naturalized in/by the institution of law was now sacralized 
in/as the Word of God. 'Sin', says Kierkegaard, ' is the only thing 
universally predicated of man which cannot in any way ... be affirmed of 
God' (1954: 252). The people oflsrael were elected by God through their 
guilt towards Him, and it is this archetypal sin that gives them direct 
access to His will and benevolence. Nietzsche's conception of the Western 
tradition is ultimately encapsulated in this polarity: the Greek's major 
offer to civilization is the tragic, the Jew's sin - the destruction and the 
sacralization of guilt respectively. In this respect, his Genealogy of Morals 
should also be read as an archaeology of sin. 
3. S0ren Kierkegaard remains the greatest theorist of sin, transgression­
as-fall, in modern times. In The Sickness unto Death (another term for the 
'will to nothingness') he explored the process of the individuation of sin 
by Christianity. While sin in the orthodox Judaic theology remained a 
collective experience defining the identity of a particular nation, with 
Christianity, which addressed the message of the Gospel to all people, it 
became the beginning and the mark of every man's relation with God. 
'Here Christianity begins with the doctrine of the sin, and therefore with 
the individual' (1954: 251). 'The category of sin is the category of the 
individual' (1954: 250). 'The doctrine of sin .. . fixes then the qualitative 
distinction between God and man ... ' (1954: 252). 'And therewith Christi­
anity begins, by making every man an individual, an individual sinner' 
(1954: 253). 
In this series of aphorisms, Kierkagaard defines succinctly the Christian 
ethic using his unique rhetoric of religious violence. According to this 
doctrine, subjectivity is the sin of the individual but also the presupposi­
tion of salvation. The advent of Christianity made every man a 'bad 
conscience' and confirmed his anxiety of indebtedness as guilt towards 
God, that is, sin. Man becomes an individual through his sins; to be an 
individual is to sin; to sin is to commit individuality and differentiation. 
Man separates himself from God when he sins, yet only as a sinner can he 
achieve himself and find Him. Clearly, the implication is that 'the 
individual is a sinner, but then again that it is perfection to be the 
individual' (1954:.252). 
With Kierkegaard's notion of individuality we are back to Bloom's idea 
of the individual artist, the 'strong poet' (which is just one incidence 
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of the pervasive influence of 'sin' in post-structuralist theory). There is no 
escape from the fall of belatedness or the curse of sin: they are the 
necessary preconditions of salvation - art and faith respectively. Man 
reports to tradition or God for his individuality and is accountable for its 
affirmation, his great sin. At the same time, it is only the overcoming of 
this affirmation that helps him win the battle against time and flesh. From 
a semiotic viewpoint, the theology of guilt is the hermeneutics of sin: 
whereas guilt is the outcome of the deviant interpretation, sin is the 
experience of any interpretation and the consequence of the exile into 
signification. To misread a sign and transgress a code is to break a rule, 
and entails punishment; but in the Judeo-Christian context, to interpret at 
all and to speak after Babel is the fall into ecriture, in itself damnation. 
Beyond the naturalization of a code as morality, this is the interiorization 
of a sign-system as God the Judge which follows the (leap of) faith in the 
violent rhetoric of religion. 
The violence exercised by the operations of transcendental signifieds 
assumes the rhetoric of a divine judgement whose subject is the interpre­
tive performance of every sinner, since 'the concept of judgement 
corresponds to the individual' (1954: 253-54). The sinner is accused for 
the profanity of the signifier while 'God is "the Judge" because before him 
there is no crowd but only individuals' (1954: 254). Thus sin and 
signification are closely linked: to signify is to sin while to 'speak in 
tongues' is to believe. Only when the signifier becomes identical with the 
signified, only when language gives itself up to the Word, only when 
individuality waives its right to interpret, the sin of the sign is absolved. 
Kierkegaard's notion of individuality eloquently corresponds to Ni­
etzsche's 'internalization of man', and testifies to their agreement that the 
origin of sin lies in 'bad conscience': 'By the aid of conscience things are so 
arranged that the judicial report follows at once upon every fault, and 
that the guilty one himself must write it' (1954: 255). Kierkegaard differs 
from Nietzsche in that his version of theophany as judgement conceals the 
operations of law and the morality of teleology described with unprohi­
bited force by Paul in his Epistle to the Romans (chapter 7). 
For Paul, sin does not stem from the individual's private experience of 
God but from the public encounter with the law. 'Nay, I had not known 
sin, but by the law.' The law makes man a sinner. 'For without the law sin 
was dead.' The purpose of the code is to incite transgression, the function 
of the rules is to invite their violation. In this sense, morality is a negative 
code, a no-saying, an established system of prohibition that makes guilt 
necessary and inescapable. The encounter with the law is the secular 
experience of God: to obey the law is to read His Book and His Word. 
But man cannot read because he has been condemned to interpret and 
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therefore misread, which is to sin. That is why, although the law is holy, it 
also incites sin. The rhetoric of the law represents the Word of God as its 
incarnation and man's incarceration. 
According to Paul, the source of sin is not internal, the guilt of 
individuality, but an external one, the all-encompassing existence of law. 
The law is the horizon of human experience and the limit of its freedom: 
every decision is inherently related to its prescriptions; we know the world 
through the law, the absolute code, God's semiosis of His Will. Man's 
predicament is to interpret and to sin: 'for what I would, that I do not; but 
what I hate, that do I.' Paul's self-negation, 'Now then it is no more I that 
do it, but sin that dwelleth in me', could be any late-comer's apology for 
his unsettled anxieties, yet he makes it very clear that sin is not part of 
man's weak nature but a result of his imperfect submission to law. Sin is 
the message that law yields to man's interpretation. But without this sign­
system there would be no such message. The violence exercised by the 
system is that it enforces its violation, that is, makes every reading a 
necessary transgression. Only complete, unconditional submission could 
produce salvation. Man's individuality of sinful interpretation is defined 
and dictated by the system to be read, the Book of Law. 
4. The paradigmatic description of this existential heteronomy is con­
tained in Kafka's hermeneutic allegory 'Before the Law' (first published in 
1916) in The Trial (1925: chapter 9). The hero's life is determined by the 
Law: he begs for admittance in vain, and stays outside hoping, although 
his expectations are gradually frustrated. He tries everything, omits 
nothing, remains totally devoted to his aim, but to no avail: before his 
death he is told that the door he has been waiting at was only for him, 
purported to stand there and signify his exclusion. Because exclusion is 
precisely the way he experiences the Law, and the entrance is the single 
signifier he cannot help thinking about, interpreting, and misreading: this 
is what the priest terms for K. as 'delusion'. 
For Kierkegaard, individuality is human perfection, although its 
practices cause sin; its anxious experience allows man to communicate 
directly with God. On the contrary, for Kafka, individuality is punish­
ment itself: the hero of the allegory suffers the law as his impossible 
admittance and his exclusion as his own failure: he is paying for the sin of 
his individuality. In the beginning, he becomes aware of his guilt because 
of the existence of the law - invisible, impersonal, impenetrable. Then he 
goes to beg for permission to enter, for acceptance and salvation. Finally, 
he realizes that the signified concealed by the door is not the authority of 
the law but the sin of his self: here what Nietzsche calls the 'inernalization 
of man'. the social infection of bad conscience, reaches its last stage: man 
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curses himself for the mistake of existence. A process of relentless 
metaleptical repression has truned the semiosis of political terror into the 
existential fear of semiosis - and trembling. 
�-� It should not be forgotten that this story is part of K.'s meeting with the 
priest 'In the Cathedral' - and of course that the relationship between 
the poor man and the doorkeeper in the narrated story reenacts theirs. 
The priest begins the discussion with a flat statement that sets its context: 
'You are an accused man'; and later on reminds K.: 'You are held to be 
guilty.' The whole discussion centers around questions of signification 
and interpretation since the 'Legend' comes from the 'writings which 
preface the Law', and concerns the practices of its application. What is 
implicitly contested during this exchange is, among other things, interpre­
tive authority: who has the right to explicate the signs, to assign signifieds 
to signifiers? Naturally, the priest claims this role exclusively for himself: 
he assures K. that he has narrated the story 'in the very words of the 
scriptures' and whirls at him the accusation: 'You have not enough 
respect for the written word and you are altering the story.' It is only for 
him, the representative of the Court before which K. stands accused, to 
authenticate and authorize meaning, and therefore attribute guilt and 
castigate sin. 
The priest does not hesitate to provide the perplexed sinner with what 
the commentators had to say on the story, expressing simultaneously his 
firm belief that 'the scriptures are unalterable.' In the same way that the 
hero of the allegory is deprived of admittance to the Law, K. has no direct 
access to those scriptures: it is only for a particular interpretive commu­
nity to read and explain them. His fate is to suffer for this unavailability 
and be punished for his sin of interpretation. All he knows about the 
Court is his guilt, all he learns about the scriptures is their inaccessibility. 
The rhetoric of the violence exercised on his individuality is the unthink­
able signified Otherness of the Law, God's Word, and the moralization of 
this violence produces the overwhelming depression of sin. 
The closest parallel to the figure of the priest that the history of 
philosophy has ever offered is Jacques Derrida: although they both 
seemingly defend writing and the multiplicity of interpretations, their 
ahistorical accounts of meaning's supplementarity preserve the unassaila­
ble authority of the textuality of the law, the rhetoric of its violence. 
Derrida, like the priest, that 'artist of the guilty feelings' (Nietzsche), plays 
freely with conflicting interpretations without ever questioning the au­
thority of the scriptures which is eventually reconstructed by their own 
deconstructive differance. At the end of the discussion, the priest expresses 
the nihilistic message of deconstruction in an epigram: 'It is not necessary 
to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary.' The 
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subject of the 'Legend' is the necessary sin, man's fall into interpretation 
or, in semiotic terms, the politics of the hermeneutic terror. 
5. If it is Derrida's ontology of the ecriture/scripture that speaks through 
the priest in Kafka's book, it is Paul's idea of sin that haunts K. 's bad 
conscience. The two of them, Kafka and Paul, are brought together in 
Ricoeur's essay on 'Guilt, Ethics, and Religion' (1974), that attempts to 
answer Nietzsche's genealogy and objectify the anxiety of debt as the 
experience of evil. He grounds his phenomenological analysis on a sharp 
distinction between sin and guilt, between the suffering of Kierkegaard 
and the torture of K. First, he affirms Kierkegaard's position: 'Sin is a real 
condition, an objective situation; I would venture to say, an ontological 
dimension of existence' (1974: 428). It is a stain of fault and failure, and 
the mark of a force that overpowers man's actions. If sin is the ultimate 
signified of the symbolism of stain, guilt's signifying practices are usually 
represented by the institution of the tribunal, the Court prosecuting K. 
But public morality has transposed the operations of that institution into 
the internal, private domain so that they have become internalized as the 
tyranny of 'bad conscience'. 'Thus guilt becomes a way of putting oneself 
before a sort of invisible tribunal which measures the offense, pronounces 
the condemnation, and inflicts the punishment' (1974: 429). 
At this point, Ricoeur inserts the Nietzschean analysis that conceived of 
sin as the interiorization of guilt by the J_udeo-Christian theology, revises 
Kierkagaard's identification of sin with individuality, and argues that 
'while sin is still a collective reality, in which a whole community is 
implicated, guilt tends to individualize itself (1974: 429). For him, 
therefore, guilt is interiorized sin, the private experience of sin that haunts 
moral consciousness with the judgements of the tribunal of self-reflexivity 
which he calls 'scrupulosity'. With the affliction of the scrupulous 
conscience, 'we enter into the hell of guilt, such as Saint Paul described it: 
the law itself becomes a source of sin' (1974: 430). For Ricoeur, the 
individual experience of the rhetoric of violence results in the malediction 
of guilt. 'Guilt has then become that irreversible misfortune described by 
Kafka: condemnation has become damnation' (1974: 430). The pathol­
ogy, then, of the moral consciousness afflicted by guilt and trapped in the 
prison-house of unfulfilled obligation lies at the center of his investiga­
tion. 
But according to Paul, sin is known only through and because of the 
law, the system of signs established by true religion. 'For we know that 
the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin', he confesses. If the 
language of the law is violent, this is because it speaks the rhetoric of our 
sin. Thus it is the absolute sign that inflicts the terror of guilt. This sign 
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and its carrier, the law, are not predicated; we predicate and that is our 
predicament. The law predicates the conditions of our sin; the law tells us 
all we know about the world because it speaks sin. Sin, however, ls a 
negative knowledge and a negative experience since we can only conceive 
of it as transgression, as misinterpretation. 
But Ricoeur wants to break the line connecting Paul and Kierkegaard, 
and create with his hermeneutics the possibility of a correct interpreta­
tion. With this intent, he has to retain from Nietzsche the guilt-sin 
distinction which the other two thinkers ignore; with the same intent, he 
attempts to bring the ideas of the church and the state together and prove 
the superiority of religious over political discourse by introducing two 
notions that we have not encountered before in this discussion: evil and 
freedom. 
While for Paul the law is the fanguage of sin, for Ricoeur it is only its 
rhetoric, which causes the anxiety of guilt manifested as/in the scrupulous 
consciousness. The true source of sin is a very real one, evil, that is, 
wrong-doing. Doing wrong marks the contours of human responsibility: 
it must and it can be avoided, so that God's will shall not be violated, sin 
shall not be commited, and guilt shall not develop. Man is responsible 
because he is not born into sin but only chooses to practice it by doing 
what he knows from the law is wrong. And if there is responsibility, this is 
because the possibility (but not necessity) of evil affirms__freedom. 'Evil has 
the meaning of evil because it is the work of freedom; I am the author of 
evil' (1974: 431). 
Ricoeur discovers a clese link between evil and freedom that makes 
them entail each other, and even makes him speak about 'my evil 
freedom' (1974: 431). In semiotic terms, he contends that misinterpreta­
tion proves the possibility of correct interpretation and that 
und�rstanding is not the fundamental mode of existence or trope of sin, 
but the very locus of man's responsibility. It is the semiosis of this 
responsibility that can lead to sin or salvation: signification is not 
damnation but the exemplary exercise of freedom, 
On second reflection, though, it seems paradoxical that behind the 
symmetrical relationship between evil and freedom that Ricoeur defines, 
another already familiar symmetry lurks - between law and sin - which 
mirrors their mutual interdependence. When he asserts that 'evil is 
nothing in itself; . . .  it is a relation, not a thing, a relation invert�9 with 
regard to the order of preference and subordination indicated by obliga­
tion' (1974: 433), he himself points to this connection. If freedom includes 
evil and evil reveals freedom, then an analogy can be seen between the 
parallel ways in which sin includes law and law reveals sin. Individual 
responsibility is again judged acco;.ding to its semiotic performance: 
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if signification includes the transcendental signified and this reveals 
signification, then this is still the same rhetoric of onto-theological 
violence exercising its unremitting terror on interpretation. 
The suspicion is confirmed when Ricoeur defines evil as 'a preference 
which ought not to have been' (1974: 434), since it is the law that 
delineates (and enforces and punishes) this 'ought not' - the rules 
prescribing human oblig�tion. The introduction of the notion of freedom 
in order to transform obligation (as defined by the law) into responsibility 
(as allowed for by personal choice) cannot prevent the conclusion that evil 
is essentially the relation of freedom to the law and therefore must be 
understood as the possibility of the violation of the latter. Evil is simply a 
reification of the necessary sin 'which makes it so that I must do evil. This 
contradiction is interior to my freedom' (1974: 436). Evil is the signifier 
and sin the signified of my compulsively interpretive freedom. 
Ricoeur is unable to solve this existential contradiction which leaves 
man engulfed by the self-reflexive mirrors of scrupulous signification, and 
he eventually takes refuge in the promise of Christian hope. But the far­
reaching implications of the dichotomy he has established are examined 
from the viewpoint of political theory in that epic of the law instructing 
freedom about the calamities of evil, Leviathan. 
6. Hobbes takes good care of the political reinforcement of Ricoeur's 
positions. First, he agrees that freedom is man's while the necessity of evil 
is God's. 'And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth 
also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the 
necessity of doing that which God will, and no more, nor less' (1962: 160). 
This point proves his initial remark: 'Liberty, and necessity are consistent' 
(1962: 160). The next remark concerns the freedom of human actions: 
people are free to do whatever they want, and the fear of law many times 
does not prevent them from taking a particular path. It follows that 'fear 
and liberty are consistent' (1962: 159). But even the application of the law 
can do no · harm since the power of a representative authority to 
administer it derives again from the law itself and can cause no injustice. 
This is then the third remark: 'Liberty of the subject is consistent with the 
unlimited power of the sovereign' (1962: 161). 
This series of observations leads Ricoeur's conception of the human 
freedom under moral obligation to its logical conclusion and effectively 
substitutes the absence of the biblical God, which allows for the presence 
and the sin of subjectivity, with the presence of the secular Kingdom, the 
State, which demands the absence and self�effacement of individuality: 
'For in the act of our submission, consisteth both our obligation, and our 
liberty' (1962: l 63). It is the absence of God and the presence of the 
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sovereign which allows for the emergence of the interpretive subject and 
its semiotic subjection. 
Obedience is, of course, due to the sovereign because 'the sovereign is 
legislator' (1962: 199) - the maker and the guardian of law. That law 
through which the subject experiences its subjectivity and subjection is the ·-= 
civil one: 'CIVIL LAW, is to every subject, those rules, which the 
commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other suffici-
ent sign of the will, to make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong; 
that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule' 
(1962: 198). This whole ingeniously tautological definition (the law is 
those rules which help distinguish what is contrary to the rules), and the 
use of the term 'sign' in particular, brings to mind Nietzsche's two kinds 
of philosophers, those who ascertain and those who command evalu­
ations, and shares with that distinction the important assumption that we 
learn what is right and wrong by reading signs. It is only through the use 
of signs that we understand, we know the world, we obey the law - or we 
sin. And it is only in our capacity as interpreters of the law that we sin. 
Ricoeur, though, thought that we are simultaneously the interpreters of 
the law and the authors of evil. This insight revises Kafka's story within a 
story and makes the hero of the allegory responsible for the very existence 
of the Law as well as K. a member of the Court prosecuting him. Hobbes 
accepts this revision when he says that 'every subject is author of every act 
the sovereign doth' (1962: 161); he also amplifies the same point elsewhere 
by explaining that 'every subject is by this institution [of a common­
wealth] author of all the actions, and judgements of the sovereign 
instituted' (1962: 136). Hobbes takes Nietzsche's genealogy of guilt as 
ahistorized in Ricoeur's idea of communal sin and translates it into a 
powerful political dogma: the subject is the author of authority and 
consequently the actor of his own subjection. His system of a common­
wealth is the universal totalization and institutionalization of bad con­
science that is also crystallized in Bloom's conception of the literary 
tradition. 
After establishing the grounds for the individual's responsibility, 
Leviathan proceeds to appropriate for its purposes Paul's notion of sin as 
the necessary misreading of the law; 'A SIN, is not only a transgression of 
the law, but also any contempt for the legislator. For such contempt, is a 
breach of all his laws at once' (1962: 216). Sin, therefore, is not only a 
misprision, the wrong interpretation, but even any disrespect for the 
creator (like the disdain accompanying the anxiety of his influence). For 
this reason, in order to protect its subjects, the sovereign should not allow 
for private readings that tempt with contempt instead of nurturing 
obedience. 'For a private man. without the authority of the common-
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wealth, that is to say, without permission from the representant thereof, 
to interpret the law by his own spirit, is another error in the politics' 
(1962: 491). Along lines similar to those of Derrida's ontology of the Text 
or the priest's ethics of read,ing, Hobbes argues, with another violent 
tautology that 'in the power of making laws, is comprehended also the 
power of explaining them when there.is need' (1962: 491). The politics of 
interpretation is concealed by the (insidiously political) proposition that 
signification unavoidably mirrors and repeats endlessly the rhetoric of the 
text, that is, the rules of the law; this is the sin of interpretation and the 
aporia of the unquestioning submission. 
Since space is lacking here, we must mention only in passing the 
enumeration in Leviathan of the 'four causes of spiritual darkness' 
( 1962: 438) that can lead to a life of sin and destruction: they are the abuse 
of the Scriptures, 'the demonology of the heathen poets', the religion and 
the 'erroneous philosophy of the Greeks', and false traditions and feigned 
history. Carefully circumscribed here are the four major areas of semiotic 
contestation in western civilization where the struggle over definitive and 
exclusive explication is constantly being waged: the Bible, art, Greek 
thought, and the uses of history. Every institution acquiring power, in 
order to establish its interpretive authority, must define its relation to 
these areas of intellectual experience and appropriate their significance for 
the sake of its own preservation. 
The last stage in Hobbes' argumentation, after he has established the 
notion of sin as transgression of the law, is to achieve an over-arching 
equation between the civil, the natural, and the sacred law, and prove 
that, although of a different nature, they have the same importance and 
power of jurisdiction over life. Since the Scriptures were made law by the 
authority of the commonwealth, they are an integral part of the civil law; 
and since the law of nature is but a material realization of the law of God 
- obeying the commandments of the civil sovereign is like following the 
rules of nature and observing the faith at the same time. The ulterior 
purpose of Hobbes' system is to establish obedience to law as the only 
viable alternative to its interpretation, which violates God's will. 
The identification of the civil with the natural law supports the 
position: 'Obedience to God and to the civil sovereign not inconsistent, 
whether Christian, or intJ.del' (1962: 435), and completes the rules of 
conduct in the commonwealth. The correct way to read a rule is to obey 
it; and the direct way to do it is to obey the sovereign. Obedience to the 
civil law is the best secular expression of faith, Christian. or other - a 
public statement which revalidates the identity between divine and state 
law. 'All that is NECESSARY to salvation, is contained in two virtues, 
faith in Christ and obedience to laws' (1962: 425). Irrespectively of what 
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the laws are, to obey is to believe; and the best exercise of individual 
freedom is conceived by Hobbes as that complete surrender of one's 
interpretive rights to the sovereign's semiotic jurisdiction, which is always 
rewarded with salvation. 
The totalitarian order of things described in Leviathan represents a 
perfect form of sign canonization which uses the rhetoric of symmetry to 
impose the violence of equivalence on the act of interpretation. The whole 
scheme is based on the elementary polarity which opposes the sin of 
interpretation to the salvation of obedience, the scepticism of reading to 
the faith to the text: to exercise your freedom by reading the law is to see 
the law as a convention, conceive of obedience only as on interpretive 
option, and therefore commit the sin of transgression; to practice your 
faith by interiorizing the law is to see the law as natural, think of 
obedience as the only correct interpretation, and therefore give yourself 
up to atonement. It is faith-as-the-belief-in-the-signified that saves man 
from the curse of language and the abyss of signification. If Bloom's 
Satan is the 'great rhetorician' (Bloom 1976: 23) of the anxiety (and the 
ethics) of guilt, it is Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor who is the great 
rhetorician of the terror (and the politics) of salvation. 
7. The drama of The Brothers Karamazov centers around the twin poles of 
sin and salvation, but their polarity is radically undermined by Ivan's 
poem (in Book 5, chapter 5). While Kafka made the Court omnipresent 
and invisible, Dostoyevsky has its supreme representative, the Inquisitor, 
the sovereign of the commonwealth, address 'the Prisoner'. He tells him 
that interpretive freedom is the right people abhor for it entails the 
individual responsibility of choice. Instead, they let others interpret and 
prefer to obey the ideal signs they erect. Servile obedience takes the 
burden of freedom away and restores the happiness of ignorance; people 
eagerly exchange freedom with blind faith to the law for that blissful 
happiness. Thus the law takes interpretation, the responsibility of free­
dom, away from man, and in this act of supression the rhetoric of violence 
reaches its goal: it is internalized as self-forgetfulness, the terminal 
semiotic impotence. Man's inquisitive 'freedom of faith' (1958: 294), 
'freedom of conscience' (1958: 298), and 'freedom of choice' (1958: 299) 
yields to what the Grand Interpreter as priest (Kafka) or deconstructor 
(Derrida) or strong poet (Bloom) calls 'necessity' - the old Adam, the 
guild of knowledge. 
The Inquisitor preaches atonement by submission: 'Oh, we will con­
vince them that only then will they become free when they have resigned 
their freedom to us and have submitted to us' (1958: 303) - 'and they will 
submit themselves to us gladly and cheerfully' (1958: 304). But this 
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benevolent legislator who is very much aware of Paul's position that it is 
the law which creates sin, that sin's possibility stems from the institution 
of law, will allow for sin in exchange for his subjects' complete obedience: 
'We shall tell them that every sin can be expiated, if committed with our 
permission' (1958: 304). Thus transgression is incorporated into the 
dominant sign-system and becomes just another function of the law; its 
total neutralization represents the greatest promise that the Inquisitor is 
able to give mankind: happiness, that is, secular salvation. 
Ricoeur's faith can afford only the 'hope' of an edenic language of pure 
signifieds and after-life justice; but the Inquisitor's commonwealth takes 
the initiative to remedy the uncertain expectations of the believer by 
deceiving him into surrendering his responsibility to a secular paradise of 
transparent signs. Thus the op.erations of the State take it upon them­
selves to rectify the religious anxieties of the scrupulous conscience: 'We 
have corrected your great work and have based it on miracle, mystery, and 
authority' (1958: 301). Nothing should be understood any longer, only 
known through/as law, the inviolable system of norms codifying reality 
into a communal experience of happiness that suppresses the individual 
experience of violence. The absolute presence of the law not only restores 
the absence of God but also destroys the sign and abolishes signification. 
The rhetoric of violence is the language of the transcendental signified 
spoken by the discourses of truth through the punitive theology of guilt. 
The entanglement of bad conscience in the web of signification causes the 
anxiety of belated misreading which only the redeeming promise of 
salvation, i.e., unmediated knowledge, can alleviate. Thus power is 
exercised as truth, as the perfect identity of sign and thing, word and 
· object, after violence has been interiorized as sin and its rhetoric as reality. 
The philosopher who commands evaluations, the priest who represents 
the Court, the sovereign of the commonwealth, the Grand Inquisitor -
they acquire authority (i.e., total power) when knowledge is institutional­
ized as truth, when rhetoric is naturalized in symbols, and when violence 
is interiorized as guilt. The grace of the law tropes private guilt into public 
truth - the atonement provided by the modern State, whereby rights 
assimilate desire and render it politically acceptable and socially inactive. 
But no political accommodation of desire or institutional administra­
tion of power is immune from the opposition of renewed demands which 
necessitate constant adjustments. Michel Foucault, the greatest genealo­
gist of truth after Nietzsche, has investigated the modes of production of 
kno,
wledge and shows that every exercise of authority is continuously 
involved in an epistemological warfare with its dissenters: 'Where there is 
power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance 
is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power' ( 1 978: 95)_ In The 
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History of Sexuality, Foucault devises a tentative map of the operations 
of power which produced our understanding of sexuality, and also 
provides some guidelines for the study of those operations in other 
fields. Refusing to hypostatize power as a specific social force, he 
describes the 'strictly relational character of power relationships' and 
emphasizes that their development 'depends on a multiplicity of points of 
resistance' which 'are present everywhere in the power network' 
(1978: 95). 
The main points of Foucault's argument are three. First, that there is 
no power that is not resisted and authority that is not contested: practices 
of violence clash with practices of opposition. Second, that resistance is 
not an absolute but a plural concept expressing not a revolutionary revolt 
or an existential refusal but the multitude of oppositional points in the I 
strategic field of power relations. Finally, that, as already indicated by the 
wishful cooperation of the subjects in Hobbes' commonwealth and Ivan 
Karamazov's Spain, the exercise and the resistance of power are depen-
dent on each other and usually mutually supportive. Foucault concludes 
that 'more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of 
resistance' (1978: 96) whose function is conditioned by their historical and 
local character. 
The above description takes away from the notion of resistance any 
idealistic, romantic, and heroic connotations and situates it back in the 
realm of history where the inalienable urge of human responsibility 
attempts to save the rhetoricity of all understanding from knowledge, the 
rhetoric of institutionalized violence. It is a powerful position that no 
semiotic enterprise interested in signification policies and the relevant 
politics of its own operations can safely ignore. The examination of a 
sign-system necessarily leads to an analysis of the mechanisms of power 
responsible for its constitution and should address itself to the question: 
which force relations produced this code of communication? and what 
kind of authority and violence is exercised by the rhetoric of its effective 
messages? Foucault's very appropriate reminder should be permanently 
inscribed in the interpretive practice of semiotics: 'Relations of power are 
not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships 
. . .  , but are immanent in the latter' (1978: 94). 
8. The study in hand started with a discussion of the semiotic aspect of the 
late-comer's guilt-ridden indebtedness as conceived in Bloom's anxiety of 
influence. This aesthetic (and aestheticist) allegory of sin that presents the 
artist and the semiotician as biblical hermeneuts is masterfully parodied 
by Pynchon in his Gravity 's Rainbow in a passage that destructs its 
psychopathology of interpretation and deserves full quotation: 
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all right, say we are supposed to be the Kabbalists out here, say that's our real 
Destiny, to be the scholar-magicians of the Zone, with somewhere in it a Text, to be 
picked to pieces, annotated, explicated, and masturbated till it's all squeezed limp of 
its last drop . . .  well we assumed - natiirlich! - that this holy Text had to be the 
Rocket, orururumo orunene the high, rising, dead, the blazing, the great one 
('orunene' is already being modified by the Zone-Herero children to 'omunene', the 
eldest brother) . . .  our Torah. What else? Its symmetries, its latencies, the cuteness of 
it enchanted and seduced us while the real Text persisted, somewhere else, in its 
darkness, our darkness . . .  even this far from Siidwest we are not to be spared the 
ancient tragedy of lost messages, a curse that will never leave us ( 1973: 520) 
Not what the priest castigated K. for, but this, Pynchon insists, is our 
real delusion, what we still let happen without recognizing its impact: 
while we 'go on blundering inside our front-brain faith in Kute Korres­
pondences', looking for 'Deeper Significance', trying 'to make sense out 
of, to find the meanest sharp sliver of truth in so much replication, so 
much waste' (1973: 590), the Inquisitor continues exercising his grand 
authority, administering sin and salvation. Our desperate effort to reach 
an ultimate signified and transcend the fear of the sign leaves the Court 
undisturbed to take disciplinary care of our guilt through the rhetorical 
manipulation of the signifier and the therapeutic violence of punishment. 
Seeing the number is supposed to be the point. But in the game behind the game, it 
is not the point . . . .  The odds They played here belonged to the past, the past only. 
Their odds were never probabilities, but frequencies already observed. It's the past 
that makes demands here. It whispers, and reaches after, and, sneering disa­
greeably, gooses its victims. When They chose numbers, red, black, odd, even, 
what did They mean by it? What Wheel did They set in motion? ( 1973: 208) 
This is the radical question of resistance: instead of accepting the 
universe of signs as the actualization of the world's natural order and 
refusing to suspect the forbidden knowledge, true opposition asks about 
the law protecting the validity of the code. The law is the institutionalized 
interpretation whose authority demands our freedom in exchange for 
merciful self-forgetfulness, the happiness guaranteed by a world of 
transparent signs. Most people agree to comply or admit their sinful 
individuality by spending a life bargaining with doorkeepers. Not so 
Roger Mexico 'Under the Sign of the Gross Suckling' (1973: 707). 
When Pynchon's hero is invited at the party of the 'Counterforce', he 
manages to realize that there is a grand game played there and that his 
passive participation is required and expected. Amidst a confused situa­
tion whose rhetoric mixes intellectual sophistication with cultural exploi­
tation, he translates his precarious position in the practical terms of an 
extreme dilemma: 
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They will use us. We will help legitimize Them, though They don't need it really, 
it's another dividend for Them, nice but not critical . . .  Oh yes, isn't that exactly 
what They'll do. Bringing Roger now, at a less than appropriate time and place 
here in the bosom of the Opposition . . .  - in the middle of all that he has to walk 
(ow, fuck) right into the interesting question, which is worse: living on as Their 
pet, or death? . . .  He has to choose between his life and his death. Letting it sit for 
a while is no compromise but a decision to live, on Their terms . . . ( 1973: 7 1 3) .  
At this critical moment, Mexico decides to fight for his life and 
integrity; but the game is set and the rules are 'always already' (Derrida) 
given: how can he survive? He makes a very pragmatic choice by 
employing the strategy of subversion. He has no privileged time in order 
to deconstruct or free space in order to overturn: he can only work his 
irreverent subversion of the established codes through the counter­
violence of their parodied rhetoric. No revolutionary stance of heroic 
attitude - simply a direct rebellious response, a local act of implacable 
resistance, and a very pertinent one because strictly rhetorical. He defies 
the decorum of official language by disrupting the celebration he is 
attending with his obscene verbiage and by introducing disorder to the 
prevailing system of power enunciation. Essentially, he commits an 
extremely radical reading against the rhetoric of the violence he is 
subjected to: he is subverting its conventionality by exposing the arbitrari­
ness of its tropes. His reaction can be seen as a dramatic enactment of 
Foucault's idea of resistance because it is political, local, pertinent, 
nonconformist, recalcitrant, and rhetorical. At the end, when it succeeds, 
it has nothing positive to offer as an alternative, nothing to replace the 
disturbed order with; in its negative force, it is sheer resistance, a joyful 
discursive transgression. 
* 
Perhaps it is better for this paper to stop here. Its main purpose has been 
to visit a series of disparate texts and locate in them various strategies 
whereby the violent rhetoric of power tropes bad conscience into the guilt 
of indebtedness and the sin of disobedience. The discussion (and the 
visits) could go on without end, and therefore its interruption at this point 
is a compromise between institutional limitations and tactical decisions, 
rather than the expression of some conclusion; it is also an indication of 
how far the person who signs this as an 'author' could go today. 
Tomorrow things will be different and the debate about the material 
constitution and the ideological nature of the sign will continue. But to 
that effect, it should not be easily forgotten that one of the presupposi­
tions of the debate's continuation is that nothing said herein will go 
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unquestioned or unresisted, just because of the paper's publication in 
Semiotica or its own rhetoric of violence �-
As if all words were not pockets into which now this and now that has been put, 
and now many things at once! (Nietzsche 1 967: 1 80) 
,_ 
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